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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The personal representative attempts to support the lower court's declaration of 
testacy by claiming that the lower court properly invoked the doctrine of equitable 
conversion, to change the real estate into personal property, so that it could pass as 
such under the will. The lower court's ruling never refers to this doctrine, so this Court's 
review will be the first analysis given the will under that principle. Equitable conversion 
by will has never been invoked in a Utah reported decision. The doctrine does not apply 
to this will. 
The personal representative further claims that the will contains a personal 
property residue clause, which passes the "converted" real estate and the personal 
property that is not devised in the will. There is no effective residue clause. 
The personal representative's attempts to defeat the arguments in Appellant's 
Brief fail, because the personal representative misstates the law to create the 
impression that this Court may disregard the language of the will. The personal 
representative seeks to create a will with presumptions and doctrines and citations from 
inapplicable cases. The personal representative seeks to establish his own 
understanding of the testator's intent, with an affidavit from the draftsman of the will. 
This is impermissible. 
The personal representative departs from the plain reading of the will, all in a vain 
attempt to create testacy where there is intestacy. 
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ARGUMENT 
I PRESUMPTIONS, BURDENS AND RULES ARE MIS-STATED BY THE 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
A. Ryan W. Scarritt Does Not Bear The Burden Of Establishing The 
Meaning Of The Will 
Ryan W. Scarritt does not bear the burden of establishing the meaning of the will. 
The personal representative erroneously claims Utah Code Ann §75-3-4071 places the 
burden of proving intestacy on Ryan W. Scarritt.2 No such burden is established under 
that section or any other section of the Uniform Probate Code. Because intestacy is a 
result of interpretation of the will, there is no burden of persuasion or proof. The 
interpretation of the will is a legal conclusion of the effect of the document, not a factual 
issue. Interpretation of documentary language is a question of law. This Court is free to 
interpret the will as it sees fit without regard to the decision of the lower court. Faulkner 
v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986). There is no "burden of proof" on the 
petitioner. 
B. The Presumption Against Intestacy is Inapplicable 
The personal representative repeatedly cites Matter of Estate of Gardner, 615 
P.2d 1215 (Utah 1980) to support his incantation of the "presumption of intestacy." The 
presumption, he argues, compels the court to strain the will toward testacy. Gardner 
was decided on the law existing prior to the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code. That 
statutory scheme included, as does the UPC, a series of sections on Interpretation of 
1
 The statute reads: 
Contestants of a will have the burden of establishing a lack of testamentary intent or capacity, 
undue influence, fraud, duress, mistake or revocation. 
The statute applies only to burdens as to the validity of the will, not the interpretation of the will. 
2
 Appellee's Brief at 11. 
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Wills.3 Gardner relied on former Utah Code Ann. §74-2-10 which stated a preference in 
interpreting a will: 
Of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent a 
total intestacy, (emphasis added) 
This statute is a rule of construction, not a "presumption against intestacy" requiring the 
"presumption" of facts or the fabrication of testamentary language that does not exist. 
The statute merely stated a preference for construction toward testacy in ambiguous 
situations. The statute has been repealed! Consequently, reliance on Gardner is 
questionable at best. 
Further, the statute (and the Gardner holding) applied only to avoid total 
intestacy. The statute stated a common sense rule that a person would not make a will 
which had absolutely no effect. The Gardner case applied the rule to avoid a total 
intestacy. But the statute and Gardner 60 not apply to partial intestacy because the 
making of a will is not inherently inconsistent with partial intestacy. A will is not futile 
when it disposes of some property. This case involves a partial intestacy. 
The statute relied on in Gardner has been replaced by a much different statute, 
but the personal representative cites the current statute as if it were a legislative 
prohibition of intestacy. The new statute (Utah Code Ann. §75-2-604) simply allows a 
will to operate on after-acquired property. 
The will should be interpreted to affect all the decedent's property, regardless of 
whether that property was acquired after the execution of the will. 
The statute is not a mandate that the court must contort the language of the will so that 
it encompasses all the decedent's property. The court is simply authorized to read the 
language of the will broadly as to all property the decedent owned, regardless of the 
date of acquisition. A North Carolina court refused to create a residuary clause on the 
strength of a similar rule: 
3
 See Utah Code Ann. §74-1-1 et. seq. as in existence prior to 1975 and the current Utah Code 
Ann. §75-2-601 et. seq. 
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Even though there is a presumption in law that a testator meant to dispose of all 
property, the presumption will not prevail when the words employed by the 
testator refer only to personal property and are silent as to realty. Matter of the 
Estate ofHeffner, 301 S.E. 2d 720, 725 (N.C. App. 1983) 
Even if the Court finds a "presumption against intestacy" still exists in Utah, it 
should keep in mind that it is merely an aid in construction and never comes into play 
unless there is an ambiguity in the will. The court in Lamphear v. Alch, 58 N.M. 796, 
277 P.2d 299, 302 (1954) stated: 
We are not unfamiliar with the doctrine that where ambiguity does exist, resort 
may be had to aids in construction in arriving at the true intent of the testator, 
such as the presumption against intestacy, (emphasis added) 
The court declined to use the presumption against intestacy to change the clear 
language of the will. 
The presumption against intestacy found in Gardneris really a rule of 
construction, based on a statute now repealed. The present statute is not nearly so 
affirmative, and certainly does not rise to the level of a "presumption" which creates an 
evidentiary state. The statute cannot be used to create meanings that are not set forth 
in the four corners of the will. More importantly, any presumption against intestacy 
which may exist in Utah is uniquely counterpoised opposite the presumption against 
applying the doctrine of equitable conversion.4 The presumption against intestacy 
comes into play only if the will is ambiguous; but if the will is ambiguous, equitable 
conversion cannot be invoked. 
Finally, the Gardner case is not good judicial work. The Gardner opinion states 
that a court can employ "any reasonable construction" of a will to avoid intestacy. This 
case is poor precedent because it actually uses an "linreasonable" construction in order 
to achieve an objective. The will in Gardner preceded its only dispositive clause with the 
words "In the event my husband precedes me in death . . . " The husband did not in fact 
predecease the wife but the Supreme Court gave the dispositive clause effect by 
4
 See Point II.B below. 
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obliterating the conditional language and interpreting the dispositive clause as 
unconditional. This Court should not follow the stated reasoning nor the example of 
Gardnerin "rebuilding" a will. 
C. There Is No Restraint on the Ability of Ryan W. Scarritt to Take His 
Intestate Inheritance 
The personal representative argues that the effect of the clause stating Ryan W. 
Scarritt takes nothing under the will is to effectively prohibit a determination of 
intestacy.5 However, that clause has no effect on intestacy. First of all, it is not a 
disinheritance clause but is only a declaration that nothing is granted under the will. By 
its own terms it does not affect intestacy. The clause can be given no more effect than 
its literal language. 
The only way for the decedent to effectively bar the intestate succession of his 
heirs is to ensure that he dies testate, as to all his property. 
An attempt to exclude legal heirs from participation in the estate of 
decedent is successful only as to such property as is disposed of by the 
w i l l . . . . A testator must do more than merely evince an intention to 
disinherit before the heirs' right of succession can be cut off. He must 
make a valid disposition of his property, (citations omitted) Estate of 
Munson, 330 P. 2d 302, 304-305 (Cal. App. 1958) 
The fact that a person is disinherited by the will does not prevent his sharing as 
an heir at law, in property the testamentary disposition of which has failed by 
lapse.. . . A testator cannot disinherit his heirs by words alone, but in order to do 
so the property must be given to somebody else. Estate ofStroble, 6 
Kan.App.2d 955, 636 P. 2d 236, 242 (Kan. App. 1981). 
The clause noting that Ryan W. Scarritt takes nothing under the will has no effect on his 
inheritance rights or on the construction of the will.6 
5
 Appellee's Brief at 48. 
6
 This subject was fully briefed in Petitioner's Memorandum In Support Of Petition For Formal 
Probate Of Will, Construction Of Will, Declaration Of Partial Intestacy, And Supervised Administration, 
R . The lower court placed no reliance on this provision of the will, and the personal representative 
has not cross-appealed this implicit determination that the clause has no bearing on the rights of Ryan W. 
Scarritt in this proceeding. 
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.D. The Testator's Intent must be Determined from His Will 
The personal representative fails to understand the distinction between 
construing the will to effectuate the testator's intent and determining the testator's intent 
from the will. Point I of the personal representative's argument is entitled 
THE WILL MUST BE CONSTRUED TO EFFECTUATE THE TESTATOR'S 
INTENT. 
However, all the authorities cited in that section are for the proposition that the 
testator's intent is determined from the will. The personal representative would have 
the court construe or contort the will to effectuate an intent conceived in the personal 
representative's mind. The personal representative's individual subjective impression of 
the testator's intent has no meaning for this Court. The will cannot be bent to effectuate 
that intent. The intent of the testator is determined from the language of the will. 
The intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of his 
dispositions. Utah Code Ann §75-2-603. 
The Court must rely on the will, standing alone, as a declaration of the testator's 
intent. 
If [the testator] sees fit for any reason not to dispose of any part of his estate, or 
such is the result of ignorance or oversight, the courts cannot supply the gap or 
hiatus and reconstruct the will. To do so would be a perversion of the functions 
of the court and deprive a testator of the right to dispose of his property." 
(emphasis added) In re Swape's Estate, 398 Pa. 494, 119 A.2d 57, 59 (1956). 
The Court must not supply language to dispose of real estate and other personal 
property which is not disposed of in the will.7 
E. Resort To Extrinsic Evidence is Inappropriate 
At three points in his brief, the personal representative refers to an Affidavit of 
James M. Park.8 These references to a document outside the will are entirely improper. 
For a more in depth discussion of this subject see Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 11 through 13. 
Appellee's Brief at pages 18, 33, and 43 
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The issue of consideration of extrinsic evidence was briefed below and the court 
repudiated any resort to the affidavit. 
Resort to extrinsic evidence is permitted only when the testator attempts to state 
his intention in the will, but does so ambiguously. Memorandum Decision, R.112 
at 113-114. 
The court below placed no reliance on the affidavit and this Court should likewise 
disregard it as an invalid attempt to supplant a valid testimony declaration. The 
personal representative has not appealed the lower court's refusal to consider the 
affidavit. 
Not only is all extrinsic evidence inadmissible in this case, but the particular 
affidavit sought to be admitted is lacking in evidentiary value and is inadmissible even if 
extrinsic evidence were permitted.9 The lower court did not rely on such evidence and 
this court must not rely on such evidence: 
In determining the testator's intention, the true purpose of the inquiry is to 
ascertain not what he meant to express apart from the language used, but what 
the words he has used do express. Accordingly where there is no dispute as to 
what words were written in the will it is a fundamental principle that the extrinsic 
evidence cannot be received to show that the testator intended something 
outside of and independent of, such written words, to add words to those in the 
will, to contradict his language, or to take words away from those in the will, even 
though the court may believe that the actual disposition of the testator's property 
which results through changing circumstances, was not contemplated by him. 
(emphasis added) Lamphear v. Alch, 58 N.M. 796, 277 P.2d 299, 302 (1954) 
quoting 4 Page on Wills, § 1617, 622-625. 
Finding ambiguity where there is none "opens wide the door to allowing the 
substitution of another's will for that of the testator." Id 
9
 The inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence and the defects in this particular affidavit were briefed 
below. Point I, Reply Memorandum in Support of Petitions of Ryan W. Scarritt, pages 5-9, R. . 
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F. The Lack of a Residuary Clause Does Not Justify Heroic Rewriting of 
the Wiii 
In Lamphear v. Alch, 58 N.M. 796, 277 P.2d 299 (1954) the Court was invited to 
stretch a residuary clause to embrace real estate, even though the clause did not 
mention real estate. The court asked the question: 
At the outset the naked question emerges whether a purported disposal of 
property reading: 
"After the payment of my just debts and funeral charges I devise and 
bequeath as follows: To Lorena J. Stallard all my personal property . . . " 
may with propriety and correctness be given effect as if it read: 
"After the payment of my just debts and funeral charges, I devise and 
bequeath as follows: To Lorena J. Stallard all my estate,, real, personal 
and mixed, of whatever it may consist and wherever situated." 
277 P.2d at 300-301 
The court defined its dilemma as one of re-writing the will to accomplish a desired result, 
and avoid intestacy. This clear formulation of the issue helped the court in its decision-
making. 
The equally clear answer to the question was "no." The court found that the real 
estate was not disposed of under the residuary clause, and that it passed in intestacy. 
The wisdom behind the ruling was that departure from the language of the will invited a 
morass of problems: 
We think any construction which carries us away from the plain, understandable 
and commonplace meaning of the words here employed leads us into a lush 
growth of tangled conjecture, which indulged, makes any declaration of intent on 
the part of the testator pure guesswork, as likely to defeat as to carry out his true 
intent. 277P.2dat302 
The court rejected the invitation to re-write the will to achieve a "fair" result. 
If the testator in the present case intended to devise his real estate, he certainly 
could have named a devisee. As it now stands, there is no language supporting the 
view that he intended his real estate to pass under the will or to whom he intended it be 
distributed. Trying to make such a determination is pure guesswork. 
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II THE BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION 
SHOW IT IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE 
The personal representative recognizes that the only way real estate can pass 
under the will is by invoking the fiction of equitable conversion.10 If there is no 
conversion, the real estate clearly passes by the rules of intestacy. If the real estate is 
converted to personal property by the will, then assuming the will disposes of that 
category of property, the real estate proceeds would pass with the personal property 
residue. 
The Appellees Brief devotes considerable attention to this doctrine which he did 
not brief at the trial level. The personal representative's analysis of the doctrine is 
flawed and incomplete. 
Before moving to an analysis of the specific susceptibility of this will to equitable 
conversion, this section will review the background and context of equitable conversion. 
A. The Doctrine of Equitable Conversion Only Applies Where The Legal 
Result Would Contradict The Will's Clear Expression of the Testator's 
Intent 
The doctrine of equitable conversion by will is a device used when strict 
application of the law would do violence to a testator's intent. The doctrine allows a 
legal real estate interest to be treated as if it were personal property. The disregard of 
the legal truth is justified by a claim that equity is being done. "Equity regards as done 
that which should be done." Hence, a real estate contract seller's interest in land 
(apparent fee simple) may be exempted from judgment liens, to protect the purchaser of 
the land from an unwarranted lien. Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P. 2d 802 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) 
Obviously, since the doctrine is a fictional treatment to avoid a legal result, it must 
be invoked with caution and on definite standards. Otherwise the fiction swallows 
Appellee's Brief at 12. 
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reality. Its application requires constant watchfulness to guard against the tendency to 
become a formal rule de jure without regard to its real purpose and necessity. 
Its application requires constant watchfulness to guard against the tendency to 
become a formal rule de jure without regard to its real purpose and 
necessity.Shaffer v. Shaffer, 354 Pa. 517, 47 A.2d 702, 704 (1946). 
"[E]quity does not regard and treat as done what might be done, or what could be done, 
but only what oughtXo be done." In re Packards Estate, 174 Ohio St. 349, 189 N.E.2d 
434,439(1963). 
B. The Presumption Is Against Equitable Conversion 
In determining whether to invoke this fiction, the Court must remember the strong 
presumption against applying the doctrine of equitable conversion: 
Few testators have any knowledge of the doctrine, or any actual intent to change 
the nature of their property . . . the presumption, therefore, no matter what the 
form of words used, is always against conversion: and even where it is required it 
must be kept within the limits of actual necessity. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 354 Pa. 
517, 47 A.2d 702, 704(1946). 
Courts will not easily resort to a construction of the will which treats realty as personalty 
because testators cannot be presumed to intend what they do not understand. 
In Re Shareffs Estate, 143 Pa. Super. 465, 17 A.2d 623, 624 (1941) similarly 
stated that the law does not favor a conversion and that "a conversion will never be 
enforced in doubtful cases . . . Therefore the presumption is always against conversion, 
and, even where it is required, it must be kept within the limits of absolute necessity." 
(emphasis added). See also Matter of Estate ofAchilli, 389 N.E. 2d 644, 647 (III. 1979). 
The personal representative must demonstrate that the will clearly requires the 
doctrine to be applied. If the will is ambiguous or it is doubtful that the will requires a 
conversion, the doctrine cannot be invoked. "The burden of proof rests on the party 
seeking to show conversion." 18 C.J.S. Conversion §15. 
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C Equitable Conversion Cases Vary Depending on the Legal Result the 
Court is Trying To Avoid 
The doctrine of equitable conversion by will is employed to defeat varying legal 
results. The application of the doctrine varies in the different types of cases.11 This is 
to be expected, as different equities are present in each type of case. Attempts to 
invoke Equitable conversion by will have been made for the following reasons: 
1. To pay taxes and debts when cash in the estate was insufficient and realty 
was not specifically devised. In re Shareff's Estate, 143 Pa. Sup. 465, 17 A.2d 
623(1941). 
2. To satisfy specific cash gifts when cash in the estate was insufficient and 
realty was not specifically devised. Talbott v. Compher, 110 A. 100 (Md. 1920). 
3. To prevent a creditor of a beneficiary from executing against realty under a 
will in the estate. Greenman v. McVey, 126 Minn. 21, 147 N.W. 812(1914); 
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. First Natl Bank, 222 P.935 (N.M. 1924). 
4. To prohibit partition of realty in the estate, allowing it to be sold by the 
executor. Keller v. Schobert, 58 lll.2d 137, 317 N.E.2d 510 (1974); Dinkins v. 
Conyers, 382 So.2d 1129 (Ala. 1980); Shaffer, Hahn v. Verret, 11 N.W.2d 551 
(Neb. 1943); John v. Turner, 6 S.E. 480 (W.V. 1939). 
5. To pass the proceeds of real property as personalty to one individual or 
group, and preventing it from passing as realty to another individual or group. 
6. To pass the proceeds of real estate as personalty under a specific 
provision in a will to avoid intestacy. Lamphear v. Alch; Grove v. Willard, 280 III. 
247, 117 N.E. 489(1917). 
The language in opinions that seemingly reflects different tests for invoking 
conversion arises in part from the different factual circumstances. The equitable 
considerations are different when the tax man is involved than when the dispute is 
between family members! Even tax cases will vary in their language because in some 
cases the tax is avoided by conversion, while in others conversion would create 
taxability. 
1
• It should be recalled that almost all cases invoking equitable conversion are older and from the 
eastern states. 
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Courts are most reluctant to apply the doctrine where the rights of personal 
property vs. real property beneficiaries are at stake (the last two categories of cases) 
since the result of the conversion is to change the recipient of property. The intention to 
pass the proceeds of the real estate in that form must be readily apparent for a court to 
take such action. Otherwise, the intention of the testator as expressed in the document 
is not being fulfilled. 
The doctrine interferes with the basic rule that real estate devolves on the date of 
death to the devisee or heir of the decedent, subject only to administration of the estate. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-101. To order conversion, a court must be able to say that the 
will so clearly treats the real estate as being sold with the decedent's death that the 
estate had no Interest In realty but merely an Interest la personalty. The fiction Is that 
there was no realty to descend or be devised; only personal property. Equitable 
conversion under a will introduces insecurity to the legal real estate records because it 
converts the recorded real estate interest into personal property by a non-record 
document. For that reason, it must be applied with caution, so that predictability and 
certainty are maintained. 
Some cases therefore require an absolute direction to sell, and a clear treatment 
of the realty as personalty in the language of the will, while others allow intent to be 
shown by a power of sale coupled with a "necessity to sell" to carry out will provisions. 
Thus, the language in some cases, taken out of context, may imply more flexibility to the 
doctrine than Is truly present. 
D. The Need for Equitable Conversion has Declined since Adoption of 
the Uniform Probate Code 
The usefulness of the doctrine has declined since adoption of the Uniform 
Probate Code. Utah Code Ann §75-3-902 and 75-3-916 govern abatement and tax 
apportionment, and would resolve cases listed above in the first two categories. See 
also Utah Code Ann §75-3-101. It would also be unlikely for Utah courts to apply the 
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doctrine in partition cases (the third category above) since these could be handled under 
Utah Code Ann §75-3-911. This is significant because in all cases involving contextual 
necessity. Utah statutes remove the need to use the doctrine of equitable conversion. 
In Utah, after the Uniform Probate Code, equitable conversion could only be 
useful to prevent creditors from levying on real property in the estate and in cases where 
parties are trying to change beneficiaries in a will (case types 5 and 6 above). 
II! THIS WILL DOES NOT FIT WITHIN THE CATEGORIES OF CASES IN 
WHICH EQUITABLE CONVERSION IS ALLOWED 
The personal representative claims that there are three types of provisions in 
wills which will invoke equitable conversion.12 This is correct. However, the personal 
representative mis-states the three indications of an intent to convert.13 The categories 
actually are: 
[W]e have stated that the three indications of an intent to convert are: (1) a 
positive direction to sell, (2) an absolute necessity to sell in order to execute the 
will, or (3) such blending of realty or personalty as to show clearly that testator 
intended to create a fund out of both real and personal estate, and to bequeath 
that fund as money, (citations omitted) Estate of Felice, 409 A.2d 382, 385 (Pa. 
1979). 
This section of the brief will explain why this will fits within none of the categories. 
All of the categories are related. They all fit within the larger umbrella of principles 
enunciated earlier for equitable conversion - the law presumes against it; the cases vary 
depending on the equities; and many cases might be decided on a statutory basis since 
adoption of the Uniform Probate Code. In addition, and most importantly, the categories 
12
 Appellee's Brief at 23. 
13
 The Appellee's Brief claims the categories are: 
A testator's intent to convert real property into personal property may be shown in three different 
ways: (1) a positive direction to sell, (2) an implied direction to sell, or (3) necessity to sell in order 
to carry out the provisions of the will. 
These categories are not found in any of the cases cited by the personal representative and are 
apparently his synthesis of the cases. 
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are simply ways of fitting like cases together. But all the cases require that the will's 
language unmistakably require conversion. 
A. A Will Must Clearly Require Sale of Land and Provide for Distribution 
of Proceeds for Equitable Conversion To Be Found 
Because equitable conversion is a fiction, and the presumption is always against 
it, all courts require that a testator's intent to convert his property and dispose of it as 
personal property be absolutely clear in the will: 
If it is apparent that it was his undoubted intention to dispose of his property in its 
converted form, then an equitable conversion of the property is effected. 27 Am. 
Jur. 2d Equitable Conversion §6. (emphasis added) 
Note that conversion and disposition must be shown: 
1. It must be apparent that it is the undoubted intention of testator to convert 
real estate to personal property; and 
2. It must be apparent that it is the undoubted intention of the testator to 
dispose of the converted personal property as such. 
The coupling of these requirements ensures that the testator's intent is being fulfilled. 
The cases show the difficult circumstances that caused the creation of doctrine. The 
following sections will examine and distinguish numerous cases, including all the cases 
cited by the personal representative. We will also show the actual provisions of the 
wills. The personal representative has not shown the Court the language of these wills, 
which are so dissimilar from the will in this case. 
B. Wills With a Mandate to Sell and Mode of Distribution Invoke the 
Doctrine 
In Keller v. Schobert, 58 III. 2d 137, 317 N.E. 2d 510, 512 (1974) the will 
contained atypical clause invoking the conversion doctrine: 
CLAUSE 2: My Executor, hereinafter named, is hereby authorized and directed 
to reduce all of my estate into cash as soon after my death as may be 
conveniently done and distribute the net proceeds of such sale or sales as is 
hereinafter set forth, (emphasis added) 
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This sort of clause is found in most wills in equitable conversion cases. This clause 
contains a direction to sell and a clear reference to distribution of the proceeds. The 
court found this language sufficient for equitable conversion to occur because there was 
a mandatory direction to sell and it was clear that the proceeds were to be distributed to 
designated beneficiaries. The opinion warns that conversion could only be ordered 
when sale and distribution of proceeds were ordered by the will: 
For there to be an equitable conversion of realty under the terms of a will, the will 
must contain a definite expression and direction, showing a definite intention, that 
the land be sold and turned into money, and that the proceeds then be distributed 
to the beneficiaries. If the executor, or other fiduciary charged, is given a choice, 
option or discretion whether the property be sold, then equitable conversion does 
not occur because there rests upon the fiduciary no duty to sell the land, 
(emphasis added) Id at 513. 
The personal representative cites many cases with similar wills mandating sale of land. 
Holzhauser v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 62 N.W.2d 229, 231 (Iowa 1953)14; Kuiken v. 
Simonds, 3 N.J. 480, 70 A.2d 740, 742 (1950)15; In re Myers1 Estate, 234 Iowa 502, 12 
N.W.2d 211, 212 (1943)16 In each case the will makes it apparent that sale is 
necessary. Those cases invoke conversion. 
The will in this case does not mandate a sale of land.17 The personal 
representative argues that the direction that the personal representative borrow against 
the ranch creates a necessity of selling the ranch. The SEVENTH Article of the will 
contemplates that sums may be borrowed against the ranch, which would be secured by 
14
 6. All of the remainder and residue of my estate shall be converted by my executor into cash, and 
the same shall be divided among my legal heirs according to the Statutes of the State of Iowa. 
[Emphasis Added] 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 18, 20. 
15
 Fourth: Upon the death of my said wife Margaret Simonds, I order and direct my executors 
hereinafter named or the survivors of them, to sell and dispose of all my real estate then 
remaining and to divide all my then remaining estate both real and personal as follows . . . . 
[Emphasis Added] 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 20, 23, 44. 
16
 The sixth clause directs that after the death of testator and his wife his executors shall as soon as 
practicable and consistent for the best interests of the estate proceed to sell and convert into cash 
all of the real estate in which his wife was devised a life interest. [Emphasis Added] 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 26. 
17
 See Appellant's Brief at 17-18. 
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the ranch, which quite obviously would be paid whenever the ranch is sold, under 
today's due-on-sale practices. However, there is nothing in the SEVENTH Article which 
dictates when the ranch shall be sold. It may be sold by the personal representative or 
it may be sold after the ranch, subject to the debt, is distributed from the estate. Clearly, 
such a secured debt would pass with the ranch property. 
The personal representative makes a selective quotation from the will, giving the 
impression that the borrowing of funds shall end at "such time as the ranch is sold."18 
The personal representative neglects to quote the entire phrase. Borrowing, 
maintenance, payroll, etc., are authorized "until such time as the ranch is sold or for a 
period of time which shall be left to the sole discreation [sic] of mv personal 
representative." The fact that the personal representative is authorized to borrow 
against the ranch does nothing to create an unavoidable necessity of sale of the ranch 
to satisfy the debt priorXo the distribution of the property. 
In any event, even if there were a mandate to sell the ranch concealed in that 
authorization to borrow, there is still no direction as to disposition of the proceeds. This 
deficiency is fatal to the claim of equitable conversion, since there is no clear compelling 
reason the realty would need to be converted. 
C. Wills With Less Than a Mandate to Sell Have Clear Language 
Showing the Sale is to Take Place and That Proceeds are to be 
Distributed 
As the personal representative points out, some cases allow conversion where 
the will lacks language compelling executor to sell. Those wills contain mere authority 
or requests to sell, but they all contain clear reference to distribution of the proceeds of 
the sale. Therefore, the sale becomes necessary to implement the testator's intent 
expressed in the will. These declarations of authority to sell and directions for 
distribution of proceeds are almost always found in the same paragraph of the will: 
Appellee's Brief at 13, quoting the SEVENTH Article. 
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A. Third. I desire that my executrix and executor, at the expiration of two years 
from the date of my demise, shall have the property sold at public auction or 
otherwise, and after paying all indebtedness standing against it, to divide the net 
proceeds of such sale into six equal parts or divisions, and to distribute the same. 
share and share alike, to my heirs and devisees as hereinafter set forth. In re 
Pforfs Estate, 77 P.825, 826 (Cal. 1904)19 
I Nellie M. Bilhorn do hereby will and bequeath to my husband . . . and request 
that he sell the Ranch on Western Avenue Los Angeles at the earliest 
convenience and give to each of mv brothers Geo B and John D McCaughna the 
price of 40 acres. McCaughna v. Bilhorn, 10 Cal. App. 2d 674, 52 P.2d 1025, 
1026(1935)20 
The other cases cited by the personal representative are In re Edwards' Estate, 168 Pa. 
Super. 471, 79 A.2d 138, 139, 140 (1953)21 \Zulver Realty Co., Inc. v. Snyder, 62 A.2d 
276, 279 (Md. Ct. App. 1948)22; Read v. Maryland General Hospital, 146 A. 742, 743 
(Md. Ct. App. 1929)23; Talbott v. Compher, 110 A. 100, 101 (Md. Ct. App. 1920)24; 
Grove v. Willard, 280 III. 247, 117 N.E. 489 (1917)25; Martin v. Preston, 94 P. 1087, 
1088 (Wash. 1908)26; Fahnestock v. Fahnestock, 25 A. 313, 315 (Pa. 1892)27 
19
 Cited in Appellee's Brief at 21, 23, 24. 
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 Cited in Appellee's Brief at 22,23, 24, 25, 26, 28. 
21
 Testatrix's will contained no residuary clause. The Franklin Street property is nowhere mentioned 
in the will, but in a codicil dated March 24, 1948, testatrix provided: "Charlie hasn't been in to 
influence me and I want him to have $500 more from the sale of property between John and 
Charlie and $500 from the sale of property on Franklin St." 
* * * * * * * * * * 
The only mention of the Franklin Street property is in the codicil where testatrix bequeaths to 
Charles F. Edwards "$500 from the sale of property on Franklin St." This implied a sale of the 
Franklin Street property, (emphasis added) 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 23, 25, 31, 32, 33. 
22
 [the will] bequeaths the sum of $1,000 to this daughter with the express direction that it shall be 
paid to her "when the Executors shall sell my Garrison Avenue Home." 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 20, 23, 25. 
23
 First: I hereby authorize and empower my Executor hereinafter named to sell all my real estate, 
either at public or private sale, in parcels, lots, or in its entirety, except that portion known as the 
cemetery lot in the rear or my home, which is to be kept intact forever, as in his discretion he may 
deem proper for the best interest of my estate, and make distribution of the proceeds derived 
therefrom in conformity with the following paragraphs of this My Last Will and Testament, 
(emphasis added) 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 29,33. 
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 I wish the said farm to be sold to the best advantage and the money divided equally between my 
surviving children. 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 23, 26. 
25
 First—I will, order and direct that all my personal property and real estate shall be held and 
controlled by my beloved wife, Amelia Grove, and that she shall have full power, after my 
decease, to sell or dispose of any or all of it as she shall think for the best interest of herself and 
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It is obvious that these wills show clear intent to sell the land with a plan of 
distribution that requires the sale. Therefore, in those cases it can be said that the will 
requires the conversion to fulfill the obvious plan of the will. 
In the present case, the will does not show a definite, clear intention that the land 
be sold and that the proceeds be distributed to designated beneficiaries. Sale is only 
"authorized" and the proceeds of any such sale are "added to the estate." (SEVENTH 
Article) The will does not say that the proceeds are to be distributed as personal 
property and it certainly does not say the proceeds are to be distributed under 
paragraph E.2. There is no expressed intention of distribution that will be frustrated if 
the conversion does not take place.28 There is no language in the will that compels the 
conclusion that the testator intended. 
D. "Discretion to Sell" is Not Enough to Invoke Conversion; Discretion 
as to Time of Sale is Not Fatal to Conversion 
The personal representative states that discretion as to the time, manner or terms 
of the sale is entirely consistent with equitable conversion, giving the impression that 
family, and upon the sale of my personal property and my real estate, my said wife, Amelia 
Grove, shall divide the proceeds of such sale in the following manner to wi t . . . (emphasis added) 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 21, 24, 25, 26. 
2 6
 Josephus M. Moore . . . died and left a will, by the terms of which he devised to his daughter Mary 
Louisa Preston, along with other property, the following: "The one-half of the proceeds of lots 
when sold of the undivided one-third interest of lots in Pullman unsold at my death." He also 
devised to his minor son Amos Abbott Moore, along with the other property, the following: "The 
one-half of the proceeds of lots when sold, of the undivided one-third of Pullman lots unsold at my 
death, his share of said proceeds to be invested to make a fund for him when he becomes of 
age." 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 21, 23, 24. 
2 7
 The Fahnestock will contained authority and power to sell in its second paragraph. Thereafter, 
several paragraphs, in considerable detail, outlined distribution of shares of the estate as small as one-
twenty-fourth part, which were to be distributed to various family members. The will outlined the uses of 
interest and income from the various portions of the estate, and te the investments deemed appropriate. 
The will also provided that the devisees could purchase at the contemplated sale, using their interest in 
the estate as credit. 
. . . it plainly appears that effect cannot be given to material provisions of the will without the 
exercise of this power, the conclusion is irresistible that a conversion is as effectually 
accomplished by the will, and the duties of the executors under it are the same, as if it contained 
a positive direction to sell. 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 29,30,32. 
28
 This has already been briefed on pages 17-18 of Appellant's Brief on Appeal. 
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mere discretion to sell is enough to invoke the conversion.29 However, the cases cited 
by the personal representative stand for the proposition that discretion as to the manner 
of sale will not defeat a conversion, so long as the will is clear and definite that it is 
required that the real estate be ?Qld and the proceed? fre distributed, In Trotter v. Van 
Pelt ,195 So. 215, 218 (Fla. 1940) the court stated that although some discretion as to 
time of sale was given, conversion was accomplished because "the fact of selling it is 
mandatory." The will provided: 
All other real estate will be disposed of as conditions are favorable for realizing 
full market value. 
The will went on to dispose of the proceeds. The will in In re Livingston's Estate, 9 P.2d 
159, 160 (Mont. 1932) allowed conversion under a will which "ordered and directed [the] 
executor to sell," although discretion as to time and terms were allowed. The will 
considered in In re Myers' Estate, 12 N.W.2d211, 213 (Iowa 1943) required that the 
"executors shall as soon as practicable and consistent for the best interests of the 
estate proceed to sell and convert into cash all of the real estate." The will went on to 
divide the proceeds of the sale among several children. The discretion as to time, place 
and manner of sale was held not to defeat the conversion. Other cases cited by the 
personal representative have the same language and result: Camden Trust Co. v. 
Haldeman33 A.2d 611 (N.J. Ch. 1943), sS£sL 40 A.3d 601 (N.J. 1945)30; In re Ellertson's 
Estate, 157 Kan. 492, 142 P.2d 724, 727 (1943)31 
These cases do not involve discretion as to the fact of sale; they involve 
discretion as to the time and manner of sale. But in each case, the sale is inevitable 
29
 Appellee's Brief at 26. 
3 0
 She said that her real estate was "to be held for awhile for best possible price or rather not sold 
immediately in order to close my estate hurridly" The necessity for sale is beyond doubt. 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 25. 
31
 [l]t is my will that. . . my real estate shall be held and managed by my brother... until such time 
as in his uncontrolled discretion it can be sold to the best advantage; and upon the sale thereof, 
the proceeds therefrom shall then be divided and distributed as in the case of my personal 
property. 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 20, 23. 
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and mandatory by the terms of the will and the will contains a disposition of proceeds 
which would be frustrated without a sale. 
The present will does not clearly show sale must occur. The will grants authority 
to sell "at such time or times and upon such terms and conditions as shall seem 
advisable." The personal representative is to operate the ranch "for a period of time 
which shall be left to the sole discreation [sic] of my personal representative." 
SEVENTH Article. The personal representative is to consult with the lawyers for the 
estate "in the selection and distribution of my real and personal property." TENTH 
Article. Surely if sale of the ranch were contemplated as essential, the personal 
representative would have been told to consult the lawyers on that subject as well. The 
scheme of this will does not indicate an inevitability of sale. Therefore, the discretion to 
sell is fatal to the claim of conversion. 
E. A Mere Insufficiency of Funds Will Not Force Conversion 
The personal representative claims that In re Suppes Estate, 185 A. 616 (Pa. 
1936) establishes that a mere insufficiency of assets to pay debts of the estate will 
cause a conversion. The will in that case however, contained "explicit authority to sell 
either real or personal property" for stated purposes. Without sale of some real estate, 
other provisions of the will relating to paying the operating costs of the homestead and 
describing the uses of income from invested proceeds of the estate would have been 
meaningless. There was much more than a mere insufficiency of assets. 
Intent to convert is not shown merely because an estate does not have enough 
cash to oav debts or specific bequests. A lack of funds may result from many other 
circumstances: 
A testator at the time of making a will may overestimate the value of his personal 
estate or he may anticipate additions to it during his lifetime which never 
materialize, or his personalty may be sufficient for the payment of debts and 
legacies when the will is executed and may become inadequate by subsequent 
depreciation in value. The personal property was insufficient for these purposes 
in this estate. But that fact does not work a conversion from necessity... The 
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question of conversion is to be determined from the intention of the 
testator from the will itself and is not affected by the accidental fact that the 
personal estate may prove insufficient for the payment of legacies or 
decedent's debts. In re Shareff's Estate, at 625. (emphasis added) 
In another case, creditors of the estate contended that since "the estate was 
insolvent, it was decedent's intention that the realty be sold to pay his debts and that this 
gave rise to an equitable conversion." The court disagreed, noting that authority to sell 
is found in almost all wills: 
Both the power to sell property of the estate and the direction to pay the testator's 
just debts are no more than a 'standard forms' power and direction given to the 
executor under most wills. We decline to hold that by inserting such standard 
clauses a testator intended an equitable conversion to occur, in the event that his 
estate was insolvent." Achilli at 647. 
If conversion were made under all wills containing authority to sell or in all estates 
without sufficient funds to pay debts or taxes, most real estate devisees would be 
divested of all their inheritance! 
The personal representative's assertion that "it is undisputed that the testator's 
estate lacks sufficient assets for the payment of his debts, the estate taxes, the cost of 
administration, and the cost of maintaining the ranch, while at the same time satisfying 
the specific bequest made in the will," is misleading.32 All of the specific bequests made 
in the will (See Articles THIRD and SIXTH) can be made without selling any real estate. 
In fact, the record also establishes that the estate taxes have been paid without a sale of 
the ranch! The personal representative's assertions that there is a need to sell the real 
estate is contrary to the record and is not entitled to any consideration by the Court. 
Even if it were necessary to sell a portion of the real estate in order to pay taxes 
this would not compel conversion. In Utah, payment of taxes and abatement issues are 
handled by statute, not by equitable conversion. 
Appellee's Brief at 14, 28 and 29. 
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F. Other Cases Cited by the Persona! Representative Are Inapplicable 
The personal representative has used the generous language about conversion 
from several cases which are wholly inapplicable because they deal with contract 
conversion [Parson v. Wolfe, 676 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)33; Lampman v. 
Sledge, 502 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973)34; In re Stephenson's Estate, 177 N.W. 
579 (Wis. 1920)35 ] or beneficial interests in trusts [Wollard v. Sulier, 55 N.M. 326, 
232P.2d 991, 994 (1951)36; Citizens'Nat'l Bank v. First Natl Bank, 222 P.935, 943 
(N.M. 1924)37 ] The Court must carefully ignore this inapplicable dictum. 
Also, the personal representative cites a New York Surrogate Court case with no 
precedential value or analysis (In Re Bondy's Estate, 118 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sur. Ct. 1952)38 
and a "hard case" which made bad law. In Greenman v. McVey, 126 Minn. 21, 147 
N.W. 812 (1914)39 the will gave a life estate in land to the surviving spouse and made 
specific cash bequests to the decedent's nine children. The decedent had no personal 
property from which the bequests could be paid and the will contained no residue clause 
disposing of the remainder interest in the real estate. The court held that there was a 
conversion of the real estate and thus prevented a judgment creditor from levying on a 
son's real estate interest. The fiction of the conversion was used to defeat the claim of 
the creditor, while preserving the entire value of the estate for the son. 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 18, 20, 21, 22, 23. 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 29, 23. 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 21, 24, 25. 
The rule as to equitable conversion of realty into personalty by creation of a trust with direction to 
the trustees to sell and distribute the proceeds is stated in Scott on Trusts, Vol. 1, Sec. 131, as 
follows: 
"Where a testator devises real property in trust and directs the trustees to sell the property and 
hold the proceeds in trust or distribute them, the interest of the beneficiaries is personal property, 
whether or not the trustee has sold the property." 
in Appellee's Brief at 20, 23, 25, 27, 29, 32. 
So in this case, it being necessary, the executors took the title in fee as trustees, and there was 
no title, legal or equitable, in the beneficiaries in and to the land, they taking only a distributive 
share in the proceeds of rents and sales, 
in Appellee's Brief at 19, 23, 24, 25. 
Appellee's Brief at 25. 











G. There is no Precedent to Support Equitable Conversion under this 
Will 
The personal representative cites no case allowing conversion where there is no 
mandate to sell, where there is no express and apparent disposition of the proceeds, 
and where discretion to sell or need to pay debts was, alone, enough to allow 
conversion. The decedent's will does not leave the unmistakable conclusion that 
conversion must occur to fulfill the testator's intent. If "there is a doubt as to the 
intention of the testator, in a direction for the conversion of land into money, the original 
character of the property will not be changed." 27 Am.Jur. 2d Equitable Conversion §5. 
This case is much like Hahn v. Verret, 11 N.W. 2d 551 (Neb. 1943)40 which 
considered a will with authority to sell, in the face of an indefinite disposition of residue 
and an apparent lack of ability to satisfy bequests. The court declined to convert the 
real estate, since there was no imperative. 
The authority given to the executors to sell does not either require or direct them 
to do so nor does it provide any purpose for which it should be sold but expressly 
makes it "subject to the terms of this Will." 11 N.W. 2d at 559. 
Similarly, nothing in this will compels conversion. Conversion ". . . to add the 
proceeds of any such sale to my estate" is conversion for no purpose at all. 
IV THE LANGUAGE OF SUBPARAGRAPH E.2. INDICATES IT IS NOT A 
PERSONAL PROPERTY RESIDUE CLAUSE 
After the determination of whether real property is converted into personal 
property by the will, the disposition of all the personal property residue is still in doubt. 
The personal representative claims that subparagraph E.2. of the THIRD Article is an 
effective disposition of this personal property. Ryan W. Scarritt has argued that this is 
not true, given the language used in the clause, its position in the will and its mode of 
Cited in Appellee's Brief at 20, 23, 24, 25. 
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disposition.41 Construing the clause as disposing of personal property also compels 
the court to ignore the SEVENTH article, which states that there will be tangible 
personal property and livestock "not effectively disposed of" by the THIRD ARTICLE. 
The personal representative claims that the language of subparagraph E.2. is 
carefully chosen, and reflects an intent to dispose of the personal property residue. The 
personal representative claims that clause uses the words "personal property" as that 
phase is defined by statute, making many references to the Uniform Probate Code 
definitions of personal property.42 However, the testator did not use the term "personal 
property" in a way that evidences his intention of drawing definitions from external 
sources. In fact, the will itself shows that the term "personal property" as used in 
subparagraph E.2. should be read as "personal effects." 
The SIXTH Article of the will shows how the testator used the term "personal 
property" and even refers to the use of that term in the THIRD Article. The SIXTH 
Article devises "all articles of personal, household or domestic use or adornment... 
excluding... such personal property as may be selected and distributed pursuant to the 
provisions of Article THIRD hereof." The only "selection" of personal property in the 
THIRD Article occurs in Subparagraph B.2. 
Thus, the SIXTH Article intends to exclude some already selected and distributed 
"personal property" from the "articles of personal, household or domestic use or 
adornment" to be distributed to Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr. This shows that in the mind of the 
testator "personal property" meant things that were within the broad group "articles of 
personal, household or domestic use or adornment." That broad category of "things 
around the house" certainly includes personal effects. That broad category certainly 
includes the shotgun and sherry set included in subparagraph E.2. But that broad 
category does not include "all personal property." The testator could not have 
Appellants Brief at 20-26. 
Appellee's Brief at 39-46. 
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used"personal propety" to mean more than personal effects. Read as a whole, the will 
belies the personal representative's attempts to give a broad meaning to the words 
"personal property" as used in subparagraph E.2. and the SIXTH Article. Subparagraph 
E.2. is only a disposition of "personal effects." This is made abundantly apparent by the 
SIXTH Article's use of the same term for the same meaning. 
CONCLUSION 
After all of the legal arguments are set out, we must return to the will. On first 
reading, it is clear that real estate is not devised. It is also clear that there is no 
conclusive, apparent scheme requiring sale of the real estate and distribution of the 
proceeds. Further, there is no disposition of the personal property residue. 
Subparagraph E.2. of the THIRD Article is merely a disposition of personal effects. The 
personal representative would have the Court hold that this subparagraph is the 
essential purpose of the will, that disposes of all the residue of the estate, when the 
SEVENTH Article says that it will not, and the SIXTH Article refers to it only as a 
disposition of personal effects. 
The decedent died intestate as to all his real property and personal property 
residue. 
DATED THIS 26th day of May, 1992. 
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE 
A Professional Corporation 
DAVID NUFFER 
Attorney for Petitioner and Appellant 
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